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Abstract. This paper investigates the effects of decentralisation on living conditions in 
core cities of the European Union. It uses data from the Urban Audit to investigate whether 
the level of local expenditures relative to central government expenditures has any impact 
on the subjective appreciation of local living conditions as measured in the Urban Audit 
Survey in 75 cities as well as the actual quality of local living conditions as measured 
by comparative crime, traffic, urban space and health statistics as measured in 560 
cities. It investigates the impact of decentralisation on these living conditions controlling 
for background factors such as population density, median income of households and 
unemployment in the cities.
The analyses show that decentralisation does have an added value in explaining 
citizen’s satisfaction with regard to public and green space, public transport, health care, 
reduces actual crime and increases feeling of safety.
This research is novel, because it is one of the first to present the outcomes of 
comparative statistical analyses in which positive impact of decentralisation on social 
living conditions on the local level is found. 
Raktažodžiai: decentralizacija, gyvenimo sąlygos, Europos Sąjunga, miesto auditas.
Keywords: Decentralisation, living conditions, European Union, Urban Audit.
Introduction
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion over the merits of decentralisation by 
presenting a comparative empirical analysis on the effects of decentralisation on the living 
conditions in core cities of the European Union. This is relevant, because living conditions 
are of utmost importance for the city’s inhabitants and the impact of decentralisation 
remains a contested subject. Whereas in the 1950s almost everyone pleaded in favour of 
centralisation, since the 1960s the cons of centralisation are emphasised and in the 1990s 
Michiel S. de Vries. Decentralisation: What Does it Contribute to? The Added Value of ... 546
decentralisation even became a crucial aspect of what was called “good governance”. The 
supposed merits of decentralisation are well-known and amply described in the literature 
of that time. After 2000 the supposed merits of decentralisation are disputed again in 
conference papers and books (see, among others, De Vries [7]; Treisman [48]). 
The problems decentralisation processes and decentralised states face are also well-
known. One major problem involves the supposedly lacking capacity of local governments 
being unable to take full advantage of the tasks and responsibilities transferred by central 
government in case of decentralisation processes or which are unable to make adequate 
policies to resolve problems in decentralised states. Especially in developing countries and 
small municipalities this is seen as a major problem [4, 20, 23]. At the same time, the lacking 
capabilities and capacities are sometimes used as an argument in favour of decentralisation 
even if any impact thereof is hardly visible. The argument goes that decentralisation as 
such is to be preferred because of this and that or even as an end in itself, and if it does 
not deliver on its promises, it is not because decentralisation is ineffective, but instead, 
the recommendation should be to enhance the capacities and capabilities of municipal 
governments in order to make decentralisation work. 
This kind of argumentation seems to make decentralisation itself a concept above all 
reproach. Nonetheless, this paper tries to investigate whether the assumption underlying this 
argument is valid by turning the argument around. Based on the argument one would not 
only expect the effects of decentralisation to be absent in case of poor municipalities lacking 
basic capacities, but one would also expect that decentralisation of responsibilities and 
authorities is advantageous for municipalities possessing ample capacities and capabilities 
to take full benefit of such decentralisation processes and that such municipalities in 
decentralised states have an advantage over similar cities in centralised states. This would 
in an extreme case apply especially to large cities in highly developed nation-states. If 
anywhere, the benefits of decentralisation should at least be visible in such municipalities 
having the means, capacity and capability to adequately develop the local policies needed 
in case of decentralisation.
The main question addressed in this paper, is whether this claim can be substantiated 
and whether the supposed merits of decentralisation are indeed visible in the extreme case 
of core cities of the European Union. This analysis provides an extreme case, because of 
two reasons.
First of all, although differences exist, the capacity of local as well as central 
governments in the EU Member States is undisputed; the quality of the EU Member States’ 
governance is ranked among the highest in all kinds of international rankings, for instance 
in the World Governance Index (see Kauffman et al. [27]) indicating their governments 
provide ample civil liberties, political and human rights, there is political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption; the EU 
Member States belong to the few countries in the world that did not experience any warfare 
on its soil during the last decades, which is indicative of its political stability; the economic 
growth within the EU has been tremendous resulting in the fact that the EU Member 
States belong to the most wealthy and developed countries in the world. Important for this 
Viešoji politika ir administravimas. 2012, T. 11, Nr. 4, p. 545–562. 547
research is also the fact that the EU consists of sovereign nation-states with varying levels 
of decentralisation [47]. This makes it possible to investigate whether variance therein does 
make any difference.
Secondly, this research involves an extreme case, because it looks at the effects 
of decentralisation on core cities within the EU, which – perhaps contrary to smaller 
municipalities – may be expected to possess even more of the capacity and capabilities 
needed to benefit from decentralisation. If municipal capacity and capabilities is sufficient 
anywhere it should be at least in these core cities.
As will be explained in the methods section, the analyses in this research are based 
on data gathered within the so-called Urban Audit [13, 14]. Figures on living conditions in 
560 core cities and results from surveys about living conditions held in 2006 in 75 of these 
cities are used in order to test whether decentralisation does makes a difference for the 
living conditions in these cities.
Of course, we acknowledge that living conditions do not only depend on the powers 
and authorities given to local governments, i.e. decentralisation. There are numerous 
background factors determining living conditions. In this paper, we control the impact 
of decentralisation on living conditions for such background factors and investigate 
whether there is a (relevant and significant) added value of decentralization on these living 
conditions. This results in the operational research question whether or not decentralisation 
has added value for living conditions in major cities. In order to be able to answer this 
question, we need to answer the following sub-questions:
1. What might be expected on the basis of previous research about the impact of 
decentralisation on living conditions at the local level? 
2. What might be expected on the basis of previous research about the background 
factors determining the quality of living conditions in municipalities, possibly interacting 
with the impact of decentralisation?
3. What are the features of the data used – and what is the quality thereof – to test 
whether these expectations are valid for the extreme case of core cities in the well-developed 
countries in the EU?
4. What does an analysis on these data show about the impact of the background 
factors and added value of decentralisation on local living conditions?
5. What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the analyses?
The next sections will successively address these five questions. Hence, in the next 
section, this paper proceeds with a concise overview of the literature addressing the 
expectations found in previous research on the impact of decentralisation.
Expectations about the Impact of Decentralization on Living Conditions 
Decentralization has in the past been judged to be either a panacea (Kochen & Deutsch 
[28], Jun, & Wright [26], Landy [29]; Ingram & Smith [25]; Robinson & White [42]), an 
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orthodoxy (Osborne & Gaebler [38]; Fine [18]; Harriss [22]); as an end in itself (World 
Bank 1984, 1988, 2000 [55]; UNDP [50]); as an aspect of good governance (Gilbert [19]; 
Huther and Anwar Shah [24], Dahal [6]; Botchway [3], Nanda [36]), but also as a heavily 
overrated concept with ambiguous impacts (Prud’homme [41], Hadiz [21]; Andrews & de 
Vries [1]) or even a fashion (De Vries [7]; Treisman [48, p. 1]). Therefore, decentralisation 
is still a heavily disputed concept. 
In part, this dispute could be due to the multitude of meanings of decentralisation. 
Some scholars define decentralisation very broadly, including such different phenomena 
as devolution, deconcentration, privatisation, delegation and even philanthropy [40, 4]. In 
order to avoid confusion, decentralisation is defined here rather narrowly, congruent to 
what has been called functional decentralisation, local autonomy, political decentralisation 
as well as administrative decentralisation, that is, the transfer of centrally produced goods 
and services to local level units of government. A decentralised system is defined here 
as one in which decision-making powers, authority and the management of budgets and 
expenditures are concentrated in the hands of local government rather than central govern-
ment. Hence, decentralisation is perceived in terms of inter-governmental relations that 
vary to the extent that either the central (national) government has the power and authority 
and takes care of the bulk of the public revenues and expenditures or the regional and local 
(sub-national) governments are dominant in all these aspects of policy making.
Partly the different appraisals of decentralisation are also due to the multitude of 
supposed, but hardly tested merits of decentralisation. The expected consequences can be 
found in numerous publications, and have been summarised, among others, by De Vries 
[7] and Treisman [48]. They point to expectations about the possibilities to satisfy citizen’s 
demands, the increased honesty, efficiency and responsiveness, better performance, 
increased possibilities for citizen participation, improved checks and balances, cooperation 
and policy stability, more policy experimentation and innovation as a consequence of 
decentralisation [48, p. 13-15]. Decentralisation would also increase the possibilities 
of tailor-made policies, to cut through red tape, to increase officials’ knowledge of and 
sensitivity to local problems; it may result in better penetration of national policies to 
remote local communities, greater representation of various religious, ethnic and tribal 
groups in the policy process, and greater administrative capability at the local level. It 
can provide a structure in which local projects can be coordinated, it may result in a 
flexible, innovative and creative administration, it is more effective in its implementation, 
because of simplified monitoring and evaluation, it can increase political stability and 
national unity and it reduces diseconomies of scale: it is more efficient [7, 44, p. 14–16]. 
However, at the same time both De Vries and Treisman put all these assumed advantages 
of decentralisation into question [7, 48 p. 11-15], resulting in the end in what they see 
as a huge ambiguity about the actual merits of decentralisation. De Vries concludes that 
regarding wicked problems too much is expected of changing institutional arrangements in 
practice [7, p. 220]. “The tendency to try to solve problems only by changing the division 
of responsibilities and powers, without looking at the real causes of such problems or at 
the substantive merits of existing policies, may well be another example of a symbolic 
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policy.” (Ibid 221). Treisman and De Vries conclude that the dissatisfaction with existing 
arrangements may well be causing institutional changes such as decentralisation, but 
also centralisation. In the conclusions of his well-argued book on the Architecture of 
Government, Treisman compares decentralisation to the fish that jumps out of the frying 
pan into the fire. “This fish deserves sympathy rather than criticism. The outcomes may be 
disastrous, but the other option is not appealing either.” [48, p. 294].
One of the problems frequently mentioned in the scholarly literature on the subject is 
that the success of decentralisation depends on the circumstances [20, 8]. However, at the 
same time Von Braun [49] argued that “there is a lack of empirical evidence to analyze the 
conditions and types of rural public goods provision and public spending that should be 
decentralized.” Theoretically, the boundary conditions are identified. Cohen & Peterson 
argue that a system that promotes accountability is a necessary condition [4, p. 75]. Musgrave 
points to the need of stabilisation of and high maintenance of employment and output; the 
achievement of high levels of wealth and income, and efficient allocation of resources [35, 
p. 181-182]. Other scholars have pointed to the weak administrative capacity at the local 
level in especially developing countries and criticise the decentralisation concept for being 
based on the favourable situation in developed countries while applied and promoted in the 
administratively weak-developing countries, especially problematic in its weak managerial 
and technical capacity [30, 31]. Effective political competition and a reasonable level of 
asset equality and literacy are also seen as necessary preconditions for decentralisation 
to achieve improved accountability [9, p. 107]. According to Heller [23], there are three 
necessary, but not sufficient preconditions for decentralisation. The first is high degree of 
central state capacity. Because any effective decentralisation effort requires coordination 
between levels of government and calls for more, not less regulation to guarantee basic 
transparency, accountability and representativity, weak states cannot successfully pursue 
decentralisation. Indeed, when a weak state devolves power, it is more often than not 
simply making accommodations with local strongmen – creating what Mamdani (1996) 
has labelled decentralised despotism – rather than expanding democratic spaces. A second 
requirement is a well developed civil society. This is true not only because it enables the 
participatory dimension of decentralisation, but also because it can potentially provide new 
sources of information and feedback, as well as the constructive tension that theorists have 
argued is an essential ingredient of democratic governance. The third is a political project 
in which an organised political force - and specifically non-Leninist left of center political 
parties that have strong social movement characteristics – champions decentralisation [23, 
p. 7-8]. Shah [46] also pointed to the operational capacity and constraints. As he argues, 
there are some key questions, the answers to which will give a better understanding of 
operational capacity, including: “Do the agencies with responsibility for various tasks 
have the capacity to undertake them? Do they have the right skills mix as well as the 
incentive to do the right things and to do them correctly? Is the bureaucratic culture 
consistent with the attainment of societal objectives? Are there binding contracts on public 
managers for output performance? Does participation by civil society help alleviate some 
of these constraints? To what extent can these constraints be overcome by government 
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reorganization and reform? Whereas, in industrial countries, answers to most of the above 
questions are expected to be in the affirmative, this is not true in the case of a developing 
country” [46, p. 7]. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya [10] pointed to quality of government 
and public goods provision, including the strength of the party system, and the election 
instead of appointment of local and province-level executives. These remarks result in 
the expectation that decentralisation will fail to fulfil on its promises when the conditions 
under which decentralisation emerges are unfavourable. 
Simultaneously, the implication is that the expected merits of decentralisation will be 
visible in favourable contexts. This is the hypothesis tested in the remainder of this paper, 
using data on core cities in the Member States of the European Union. In these cities, the 
preconditions of ample institutional, managerial and technical capacity in city hall and 
contextual factors in the municipality are largely fulfilled. In these countries and cities there 
is wealth, a very high level of literacy and certain equity. There is political competition, 
election of local councils, accountability, transparency and representativeness. Hence, the 
basic conditions under which decentralisation could flourish exist. The question is, does 
decentralisation under such favourable conditions deliver on its promises? 
Background factors having a possible impact on living conditions
The previous section has at least created doubt about the effects of decentralisation. 
This doubt also exists concerning the research question posed in this paper, namely the 
impact of decentralisation on living conditions in core cities of the European Union. This 
is all the more so, because one cannot expect that decentralisation is the only factor that 
such living conditions are dependent on. In the literature on living conditions many other 
factors are mentioned. As, for instance, Sagan et al. [45, p. 32] argue, factors frequently 
studied as determining living conditions include working conditions, leisure time activities, 
health indicators, welfare, availability of different leisure time options and access to 
various services. Young added that minority status also takes on major importance. The 
European Information Centre for Nature Conservation [11] suggested to take housing conditions, 
employment and public infrastructures such as cultural and sports into account. Given the 
large number of determinants of living conditions, the task of selecting a particular set of 
them is far from straightforward [34, p. 12]. 
Explanatory factors determining living conditions are according to Mayer [32] 
especially financial and to be found in the combination of income, expenditures, family 
size, health, and work-related expenditures [32, 2]. This is indicated below by median 
disposable household income and the unemployment rate. 
Another important explanatory factor seems to be population density, i.e. the number 
of people living on a km2. Research shows that this is determinative for the scarcity of green 
space, health, crime, and traffic jams. There is extensive research that people perform 
worse in overcrowded spaces, that it increases aggression and discomfort [43].
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Methods 
The data used in this paper are derived from the EU Urban Audit project. The goal 
of this project is to “contribute towards the improvement of the quality of urban life: 
it supports the exchange of experience among European cities; it helps to identify best 
practices; it facilitates benchmarking at the European level and provides information on 
the dynamics within the cities and with their surroundings” (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
cache/ITY_SDDS/en/urb_esms.htm). Within this project, data on factual features of 560 core 
cities in the EU were collected in four reference periods: 1989 – 1993, 1994 – 1998, 1999 – 
2002 and 2003 – 2006. The cities involved are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Source: Urban Audit Methodological handbook, [12, p. 16]
The data were collected by the national statistical offices, by the town or city, or 
from another source. In most cases, data have been obtained from censuses, different 
administrative and statistical registers, national and local databases in the individual cities 
and sample basis. In some cases, data have been obtained from a sample survey. Although 
some variables have been estimated, most indicators have been calculated by Eurostat 
(Urban Audit Reference Guide - Data 2003-2004). In January 2004, a perception survey 
parallel to the Urban Audit data collection was conducted in 31 cities of the EU-15. In 
random telephone interviews, 300 citizens in each city were asked about their perception 
of various aspects of the quality of life in “their” city. In December 2006, the survey was 
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repeated with a larger sample of 75 cities in the EU-27, Turkey and Croatia (ibid). In this 
paper, we use the latter data from 2006.
The factual data comprise information about the population in the core cities and 
larger urban zone (total, age structure, density, nationality, fertility, number and structure 
of households, number of houses and features thereof .i.e. living area and income levels) 
and several policy areas (economy, income, education, environment, transport, culture and 
recreation, tourism, green space, unemployment, health care, crime, as well as municipal 
expenditures). 
The data used from the perception data on the core cities comprise information on 
satisfaction in several areas. In this paper, we use the questions of the survey as given in 
Table 1.
Table 1. Survey questions from Urban Audit
Q1. Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather unsatisfied or 
not at all satisfied with each of the following services in your city:
a. Public transport in the city, for example the bus, tram or metro
b. Schools
c. Health care services offered by hospitals
d. Health care services offered by doctors
e. Green spaces such as public parks and gardens
f. Sports facilities such as sport fields and indoor sport halls
g. Cinemas
h. Cultural facilities such as concert halls, theatres, museums and libraries
i. Public Internet access such as internet cafés or libraries
j. Internet access at home
Q2. I will read you a few statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements?
a. In your city , it is easy to find a good job 
b. Foreigners who live in your city are well integrated
c. In your city, it is easy to find good housing at a reasonable price
d. When you contact the administrative services of your city, do they help you efficiently
e. In your city , air pollution is a big problem
f. In your city, noise is a big problem
g. Your city is a clean city
h. Your city spends its resources in a responsible way
i. You are satisfied to live in your city
j. In the next five years, it will be more pleasant to live in your city
Q3. For each of the following statements, please tell me, if this always, sometimes, rarely or never 
happens to you?
a. You have difficulty paying your bills at the end of the month
b. You feel safe in the neighborhood you live in
c. You feel safe in your city
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This survey was first held in 2004 over 35 cities and repeated in 2006 in 75 cities 
with a number of respondents per city between 297 and 308. As Eurostat mentions in its 
publications, the National Urban Audit Coordinators have checked all data before they 
were sent to Eurostat and Eurostat executed a project on the Quality Check of the Urban 
Audit between 2004 and 2005 and in 2008-2009 to detect potential errors in Urban Audit. 
Database applying systematic control procedures, and to provide Eurostat with an updated 
data set, that has been validated by the National Urban Audit Coordinators.
In this research, part of the factual data about on average 250 cities are used and 
regarding the perception data based on the surveys, the aggregated data over the cities are 
used, resulting in an N of 75. 
The data on decentralisation were also derived from Eurostat. We use national data 
on the local expenditures per GDP and central government expenditures per GDP. This 
results in an indicator on decentralisation, namely the local expenditures divided by the 
central government expenditures. This variable is indicative for the question whether local 
government is able to deal with its problems autonomously.
Analyses
In this section correlation matrices are presented for the relation between the level 
of decentralisation and the quality within four policy areas, namely public space, crime, 
public transport and health care. In the urban audit there are indicators for the actual 
level of facilities in each of these areas as well as the perceived satisfaction of the city’s 
population. Below it is shown how decentralisation at the national level is related to these 
four problems, controlling for three background factors, namely population density, 
median disposable income per household, and the unemployment rate. We control for 
these three factors, because they are indicative of the basic structure of the city and – as 
was argued above in section 3 – are known to be determinative for the problems of big 
cities. The partial correlations give the added value of decentralisation for explaining the 
level of the problems in the four policy fields. We could have presented the results of a 
regression-analysis, but because of the number of missing values on the indicators of the 
actual problems and the limited number of cities in which the surveys were conducted (75) 
a regression-analysis was likely to result in unstable parameters. Although this also applies 
to the partial correlations, we think that by presenting only the partial correlation-matrices 
we avoid pretending to get more out of the data than is justified on methodological grounds.
Green space
The first policy area investigated is that of green space in the city. Especially in big 
cities, it increases the well-being of the inhabitants if next to houses, apartments and sky 
scrapers a city also provides green space where its inhabitants can recreate, sport et cetera. 
As Santos argues: it is needed to incorporate the historical and social nature of the way 
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the space is occupied as an inherent component in the determinants of living conditions. 
“Space” becomes particularly important in large metropolises, which contain elements of 
diverse origins and ages with a multiplicity of capital, work, and cultural relations (quoted 
in Texeira 2002, 1193).
The Urban Audit measures the available green space to which the public has access 
in km2. We divided this measure by the total land area of the city. The second variable 
relevant in this respect is the question of the survey whether the respondent is satisfied 
with the green space in the city. Whether and how this relates to decentralisation is given 
in Table 2. Seen in this table is first that contrary to expectations the actual green space 
area is hardly and not significantly related to the satisfaction with the amount of green 
space in the city. However, both indicators are positively and statistically significantly 
associated with the level of decentralisation in the country in which the city is situated. 
The larger the part of public expenditures by the local level compared to the expenditures 
at the central government level, the more the municipalities in the core cities are able to 
provide accessible green space and to satisfy its citizens with such green space. One can 
conclude that in decentralised countries core cities provide a more satisfactory amount of 
green space for its inhabitants than core cities in centralised countries do.
Table 2. Decentralisation and green space in the city
Level of 
decentrali- 
sation
Actual volume 
of green space 
in km2
Satisfaction 
with green 
space
Controlled for:
Unemployment rate in Urban 
Audit cities - % 
& 
Population density in Urban 
Audit cities  
& 
Median disposable annual 
household income
Decentralisation: 
part of governmental 
expenditures by local 
government 
1,000a
Actual volume of green 
space per land area
,233* 1,000
Satisfied with public 
spaces (synthetic index 
0-100)
,344* ,115 1,000
a. Given are PM correlations. An asterix indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at 95%
Public Transport
In large cities adequate public transport is often desperately needed to go to work, to 
go to the city’s facilities and to release traffic jams. The Urban Audit points out that the 
core cities in the EU are congested with on average 378 registered cars per 1000 inhabitants 
and an average journey time to go from home to work of 25 minutes fluctuating between 
15 minutes and 71 minutes. In some cities, it takes over an hour to go to work. One solution 
for this congestion problem is to expand public transport. The degree to which public 
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transport covers the whole city is indicated in the Urban Audit by the number of stops of 
public transport per km2. In some cities, there is hardly any transport, while in other cities 
there are up to 35 stops per km2. Whether public transport is better in cities situated in 
countries where decentralisation is high, is seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Public transport and decentralisation
 
Level of 
decentrali- 
sation
Satisfied 
with public 
transport 
(synthetic 
index  
0-100)
Number of 
stops of public 
transport  
per km2
Cost of a  
monthly ticket  
for public 
transport (for 
5-10 km)
Control Variables
Unemployment 
rate in Urban Audit 
cities % 
& 
Population density in 
Urban Audit cities
& 
Median disposable 
annual household 
income
part of gov. expenditures 
by local government 
(local divided by central)
1,000
Satisfied with public 
transport (synthetic index 
0-100)
,258 1,000
Number of stops of public 
transport per km2
,181 -,087 1,000
Cost of a monthly ticket 
for public transport (for 
5-10 km)
,325* ,366 -,013 1,000
Table 3 shows that in decentralised countries inhabitants of core cities are more 
satisfied about public transport, the coverage of public transport is higher and the costs 
thereof are higher. Hence, decentralisation seems to have a positive and significant effect 
on the inhabitants’ satisfaction with public transport in the city and a positive (although not 
statistically significant) effect on the spread of public transport, although this comes at the 
price of higher cost for monthly tickets in cities situated in countries with higher levels of 
decentralisation. From the Table above one can conclude that core cities in decentralised 
countries have better public transport facilities than core cities in centralised countries.
Crime
One of the wicked problems large cities have to deal with is crime. Crime is often 
much more frequent in urban than in rural areas although it even varies among core cities. 
In the urban audit cities on average 3.95 burglaries per 1000 inhabitants are reported with 
a maximum of 23 in Almere, the Netherlands and Nottingham UK. The number of car 
thefts is somewhat lower – on average 3.45 – with a maximum of 20 per 1000 inhabitants 
in Manchester, UK. Is this variance also related to centralisation and decentralisation? In 
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many countries fierce political discussions are seen among those who plead for centralised 
police and those who favour municipal police. In Table 4, the association is shown between 
the level of decentralisation in the nation-state and the number of burglaries and car thefts 
and perceptions of safety in the core cities.
Table 4. Crime and decentralisation
Level of 
decentrali-
sation
Number of 
domestic 
burglary 
per 1000 
population
Car thefts 
in Urban 
Audit cities 
- number per 
1000 popul. 
Feel safe 
in this city 
(synthetic 
index 0-100)
Feel safe in  
this neigh- 
bourhood 
(synthetic  
index  
0-100)
Control 
Variables 
Median 
disposable 
annual 
household 
income
& 
Population 
density in Urban 
Audit cities  
& 
Unemployment 
rate in Urban 
Audit cities - %
 
 
part of gov. 
expenditures by local 
government (local 
divided by central)
1,000
Number of domestic 
burglary per 1000 
population
-,189* 1,000
Car thefts in Urban 
Audit cities - number 
per 1000 inhabitants
,127 ,398* 1,000
Feel safe in this city 
(synthetic index 0-100)
,552* -,100 ,341* 1,000
Feel safe in this 
neighbourhood 
(synthetic index 0-100)
,444* -,023 ,260 ,809* 1,000
Presented are Pearson PM correlations 
* indicates that the correlation is significant at 95%
Table 4 shows that inhabitants of core cities in decentralised states do feel more 
safe in their neighbourhood (R2=.44) and in their city (R2=.55) and that in these cities 
the municipality is more able to prevent burglaries (R2= -.19). All these relations are 
statistically significant and as before controlled for population density, unemployment and 
median household income. The only problem insignificantly related to decentralisation is 
the number of car thefts. However, overall one may conclude that also regarding crime the 
impact of decentralisation is positive on perceptions as well as occurrences.
Health care
The last policy area with which decentralisation could be related is health care. We 
investigate the number of available hospital beds, the satisfaction among the inhabitants 
with hospitals and doctors, the actual pollution in the city and the perception of pollution. 
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Table 5. Health and decentralisation
 Level of 
decentrali- 
sation
Available 
hospital beds 
in Urban 
Audit cities 
- per 1000 
inhabitants
Number of days 
particulate matter 
concentra-tions 
(PM10) exceeds 
50 µg/m³ in 
Urban Audit 
cities - days per 
year
Satisfied 
with 
hospitals 
(synthetic
 index 0-100)
Satisfied
 with 
doctors 
(synthetic 
index 
0-100)
Air pollution 
is a big 
problem 
here 
(synthetic 
index 0-100)
part of expenditures by 
local government (local 
divided by central)
1,000
Available hospital beds 
in Urban Audit cities per 
1000 inhabitants
-,292* 1,000
Number of days per 
year particulate matter 
concentrations (PM10) 
exceeds 50 µg/m³ in 
Urban Audit cities 
-,262* ,223* 1,000
Satisfied with hospitals ,314* -,175 -,340* 1,000
Satisfied with doctors ,268 -,116 -,312* ,925* 1,000
Air pollution is a big 
problem here 
-,199 -,027 ,195 -,312* -,286 1,000
Satisfied with health care ,310* -,140 -,270 ,938* ,866* -,365*
Control Variables
Unemployment rate in Urban Audit cities % 
Population density in Urban Audit cities
Median disposable annual household income
Presented are Pearson PM correlations
* indicates that the correlation is significant at 95%
Table 5 shows that all indicators but the number of hospital beds are related to 
decentralisation as expected. The satisfaction with hospitals, doctors, health care in general 
and air pollution is larger in cities situated in decentralised countries and the actual air 
pollution is less. Although not all relations are statistically significant, we can conclude 
that controlling for population density, median household income and unemployment in 
cities, cities in decentralised countries are able to take care of health care better than cities 
in which most public expenditures are done by central government.
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Hence, the outcomes of the analyses corroborate the claim that the degree to which 
core cities can autonomously decide about their policies and how much to spend on social 
problems, does have a positive effect on each of the four aspects of the living conditions of 
their inhabitants, i.e. green space, public transport, crime and health.
Conclusions
This paper investigated whether the degree of decentralisation in a nation-state has 
added explanatory value for four dimensions of the living conditions in its core cities, i.e. 
green space, public transport, crime and health. The data from the Urban Audit were used. 
This is a research project conducted on behalf of Eurostat involving 560 cities on which 
indicators for the actual number of health-care facilities, public transport, green space 
and crimes were gathered. The urban audit also involves surveys among 75 core cities in 
order to measure whether the city’s inhabitants are satisfied with, for instance, the green 
space, public transport, crime and health care. We analysed these data by relating them to 
the level of decentralisation as indicated by the expenditures of local government relative 
to those by central government. These associations were controlled for population density, 
median household income and unemployment rate in the core cities. 
The analyses in which these data were related to the level of decentralisation at the 
national level led to the following conclusions: 
1. As to perceptions, the inhabitants of cities situated in decentralised countries 
are more satisfied with the facilities with regard to green space, health care, and public 
transport and feel more safe in their neighbourhood as well as in the city as a whole.
2. As to the actual facilities and occurrences, cities in decentralised states have more 
green space in km2, they have better public transport and experience less crimes.
Overall, the conclusion cannot but be that decentralisation does have a positive and 
significant impact on the living conditions in core cities of the EU as indicated by its green 
space, public transport, crime and health care. This is a significant outcome, because it 
is, according to us, one of the first examples of comparative statistical research in which 
the positive effects of decentralisation are so clearly visible. Although decentralisation is 
one of the most discussed themes in Public Administration, hard evidence of its positive 
impacts were until now only found in theoretical arguments, case studies and rhetoric. 
The findings presented here do not, however, present a final answer nor do they provide 
decentralisation with the status of a panacea. As also shown, some associations are not 
significant, such as with the level of car thefts, the number of hospital beds, the perceived 
satisfaction with doctors and pollution. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, 
the cities investigated here can be seen as extreme cases, because the cities are large 
municipalities in wealthy countries – EU Member States - with administrative systems of 
sufficient capacity and capabilities. For instance, on the survey-question in the Urban Audit 
whether administrative services help efficiently, on average 63% of each city’s inhabitants 
(totally) agreed, with a maximum of 89% in the administratively most capable city. This is 
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unusually high and indicative of the relatively high quality of the administrative system of 
these cities. These cities are therefore able to take full benefit of decentralisation policies 
and apparently know how to spend the available resources efficiently and in such a way 
that social problems diminish and the satisfaction among its inhabitants increases. 
The findings do therefore support the views of adherents of decentralisation policies. 
They do have a point. The point being that the largest cities on the wealthiest part of this 
planet do indeed profit from decentralisation. 
The remaining question is whether that conclusion can be generalised to a statement 
that municipalities profit from decentralisation in general. This does not necessarily 
have to be the case in small municipalities and/or municipalities in relatively poor i.e. 
developing countries. In those cases it could well be much more difficult to take advantage 
of decentralisation processes. 
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Michiel S. de Vries
Decentralizacija: kokie jos padariniai? Pridėtinė decentralizacijos vertė gyvenimo 
sąlygoms pagrindiniuose ES miestuose
Anotacija
Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjamas decentralizacijos poveikis gyvenimo sąlygoms pagrindi-
niuose Europos Sąjungos miestuose. Atsižvelgiant į 75 miestų audito duomenis, taip pat į faktinę 
vietos gyvenimo sąlygų kokybę, lyginant net 560 miestų nusikalstamumo, eismo, miesto erdvės 
ir sveikatos statistiką, siekiama ištirti, ar vietinių išlaidų lygis, palyginti su centrinės valdžios 
išlaidomis, turi kokį nors poveikį vietos gyvenimo sąlygų subjektyviam vertinimui. Straipsnyje 
tiriamas decent ra lizacijos poveikis minėtoms gyvenimo sąlygoms, priklausomai nuo tokių aplin-
kos veiksnių  kaip gyventojų tankumas, vidutinės namų ūkių pajamos ir nedarbas miestuose.
Analizė rodo, kad decentralizacija turi pridėtinę vertę piliečių pasitenkinimui  viešosiomis 
erd vėmis ir žaliosiomis zonomis, viešuoju transportu, sveikatos priežiūra, ji sumažina faktinį 
nusikalstamumą ir padidina saugumo jausmą.
Šis tyrimas vienas pirmųjų pateikia lyginamosios statistinės analizės rezultatus, patvirtinan-
čius teigiamą decentralizacijos poveikį socialinėms gyvenimo sąlygoms vietos lygmeniu.
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